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ABSTRACT
The article provides a typology and a comparative analysis of academic
studies on EU-Russian economic cooperation since its formal inception in
the early 1990s. The authors strive to present a contextual analysis, explain-
ing how the bilateral trends have been perceived in the respective aca-
demic environments. On this basis, the paper accentuates problems of
academic dialogue between EU and Russian researchers, like constraints
of mutual internalization, language-determination, and diﬀerent research
agendas. Four European discourses on the role of economic relations in EU-
Russian relations are identiﬁed: Normative one (economic and non-
economic interlinkages are inseparable and structurally determined),
‘Business case’ discourse (economic relations constitute an inherent sys-
tem), ‘Neo-Ostpolitik’ discourse (establish reliable and trustful relations
between the EU and Russia) and ‘Economic statecraft’ discourse (maximiz-
ing EU power and disciplining Russia). Russian publications are usually more
policy-oriented compared to Western studies. We trace four periods:
Illusions of Euro optimism during Russian market transformation (1992–-
1999); Adaptation to the EU enlargement and Putin’s attempts to establish
a partnership with leading EU member states (1999–2008); Crisis in EU-
Russian relations (2008–2015) and New Cold War (since 2015).
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1. Introduction
EU-Russian economic relations have been developing in a solid strategic-political context since the
end of the Cold War. Economic cooperation was perceived as a major undercurrent of Brussels’
overall eﬀorts to pacify and stabilize Russia, increase Trans-European security, raise its status in
world politics by Moscow’s inclusion. Accordingly, economic relations were partly interpreted in an
instrumental way, as a major and to a certain extent automatic lever for reaching non-economic
aims. The 1999 EC Common Strategy on Russia set four principal objectives from which only one,
the ‘integration of Russia into a common European economic and social space’ was related to
economy (European Council 1999). The 2016 EU Global Strategy characterizes Russia as a 'key
strategic challenge' and does not refer to economic relations in any form (European External Action
Service 2016).
Nevertheless, Moscow precluded to participate in any institutional process under the Union’s
aegis, rejected both membership and associated status, preserving its main focus of interests on
economic cooperation (Dettke 2011). Russians oﬀered proposals of special institutional forms of
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such cooperation [e.g. Mau & Novikov, 2002] which was ignored by the EU. Furthermore, Russia
also set a high number of institutional and policy constraints within the bilateral economic
relations, eﬀectively limiting the scope of cooperation beyond certain limits. Relations with the
EU were of 'key importance' and constituted one of its 'main political and economic partners'
according to the Russian Foreign Policy Concept in 2000 (Foreign Policy Concept 2000). This
incorporates also economic relations, 'to establish a common economic and humanitarian space
from the Atlantic to the Paciﬁc', even if these objectives shall be reached 'by harmonizing and
aligning interests of European and Eurasian integration processes. . . on the principles of equality
and respect for each other’s interests' (Foreign Policy Concept 2016). This wording, the notion of
‘equality’ and the conditionality related to ‘Eurasian integration processes’ gives way for various
interpretations from both sides, unfolding potential disagreements regarding the two narratives.
This complexity and the high number of interlinkages between business and non-economic
objectives are partly justiﬁed keeping in mind that bilateral economic relations have developed
steadily in the last three decades. Despite the abrupt drop in 2014–2015, bilateral trade grew
almost fourfold between 1995 and 2016, doubling the share of Russia in the EU’s foreign trade. EU
has become and remained a major source of Russian iFDI, accounting for 80% of total inﬂow in the
high years of the early 2010s. Russian openness toward the world economy had increased
signiﬁcantly, liberalization, highly advocated by the Union had remained on Moscow’s policy
agenda at least until 2014. Russian GDP/capita, welfare increased considerably, and despite all its
deﬁciencies, the country transformed into a capitalist system, converging in many respects towards
the developed Europe. Tensions and conﬂicts mainly stemmed from other, security, foreign policy,
and ideological ﬁelds, partly justifying the under-representation of economic issues on the bilateral
agenda.
Nonetheless, the EU-Russia crisis since 2014 and the preceding hollowing of negotiations also
questions the role of economy, as ‘relational catalyzer’. It had been widely believed that given the
similar asymmetries and structures, the 'EU economic magnet' would work in the case of Russia, as
it did in many other Eastern European countries (Haukkala 2009). In this sense economic beneﬁts
will overspill into other areas, creating new opportunities for engagement. Russia also refuted the
EU’s ability to use its 'economic statecraft', to inﬂuence another power by 'oﬀering economic
rewards or withholding economic advantages' (Baldwin 1985, 3). The relation’s ebbs and ﬂows
oﬀered many opportunities to sanction Russia’s certain actions or attract its attention, but the EU
could not eﬃciently shape Moscow’s behavior (Haukkala 2009; Connoly 2016). It was the EU’s
external relations towards Russia where the gap between expectations and capabilities has
manifested itself the most obvious manner (Forsberg and Seppo 2009).
We argue that this ‘lack of overspill’ from economic to non-economic ﬁelds in the EU-Russian
relations is partly the result of diverging visions regarding the way and applicability of economic
power. The EU had no clear vision on the ﬁnality of its bilateral relations, its objectives and had no
consensual agenda how economic asymmetry can and shall be applied. Simultaneously, Russia’s EU
policy was inﬂuenced by debates about economic policy, conﬂicting diversiﬁcation and moder-
nization plans and foreign policy consequences.
The paper maps out major policy and academic narratives on EU-Russian economic relations
since the early 1990s. As a source, we used papers registered at Science Direct, Researchgate and
Russian Science Citation Index when it was applicable. Since the study overviews academic
literature since the split up of the Soviet Union, publications from the 1990s and early 2000s are
selected from peer-reviewed journals of the time. We also included policy documents in a small
number in order to demonstrate and better describe respective schools of thought. This choice is
justiﬁed, since the academic literature also referred and reﬂected to policy and non-academic
literature in a high number, making this inclusion essential.
Given the diverse nature of the literature, our typology was set along a single variable: the
interaction between economic relations and non-economic policy objectives. Given their
embedded nature, interlinkages with other, often more accentuated dimensions, the taxonomy
160 A. DEAK AND A. KUZNETSOV
of discourses is set according to the system of expectations from the Russian economic nexus.
Understandably other classiﬁcations would have been also possible. Our choice was taken on the
basis that no preceding study on classiﬁcations has been found, and the issue of interlinkages has
remained the most current and debated policy issue. On the basis of this typology, we examine
whether the parties went through a learning process and could improve their policy eﬃciency by
time.
2. Interpreting the mission: the EU’s Russia policy
The EU has been looking at the Eastern European countries, including even Russia, as potential
partners in its grand integration project. These views were more diverse andmore conditional than in
the case of new member countries. Nonetheless, Russia’s inclusion and inﬂuencing its behavior
especially within European issues remained a major issue. Thus, the central modality of EU’s bilateral
approach is the existence of a vision for the ﬁnality of EU-Russia relations and the related non-
economic objectives in its policy. Table 1 provides a short typology of academic literature according
to these visions. In one way or another all these four discourses aimed at optimizing EU policies and
except the ‘business case’ attitude they propagated that economic asymmetry plays a pivotal role in
the relations. They were represented in the oﬃcial EU policies, often in a declarative way, but their
respective inﬂuences ﬂuctuated with the ebbs and ﬂows of the bilateral ties.
Normative approaches have become popular since the end of the Cold War. Since the mid-
1980s the Community started to build an internal consensus on political and human right
conditionality in its external policies, putting it on a more normative basis (Smith 1998). By early
1995 the Council agreed that all agreements with third countries shall contain an essential
suspension mechanism. While the Eastern European accession process was seen as relatively
smooth in this regard, conditionality has been actively used in the EU-Russia relations since the
signing of the PCA in 1994. Not surprisingly and unlike Russian discourses on EU-Russian relations,
Western literature has a more dichotomous view on bilateral ties (Casier 2013). The nature of the
two entities, their incompatible agendas are widely seen as the main explanation for the hollowing
and consequently the crisis of the relations. According to these approaches, the EU constitutes
a trade power, a normative (Manners 2002), civilian (Smith 2005) and ethical power, a post-modern
(Romaniuk 2009), post-sovereign (Haukkala 2010) entity with a society oriented approach. In this
comparison, Russia is the classical, realist power with modern and sovereign conceptions about
international relations, who pursues 'manifest Realpolitik objectives' (Emerson et al. 2009, 13–15).
These concepts originate in the notion of 'clash of values' between the EU and Russia as the main
explanatory factor for the relational crisis.
Consequently, normative authors tend to subordinate economic actions to the diktats of power
politics, corporate actors to the governmental ones especially on the Russian side (Judge, Maltby, and
Sharples 2016). In these views, state ownership is seen as largely incompatible with economic rationality,
growing welfare with increasing geopolitical inﬂuence. The insular system of norms presupposes
diﬀerent actors and objectives on the two sides, making interactions much more complex and
Table 1. Western discourses on EU’s Russia policy.
Non-economic
objective Vision for Russia-policy Role of conditionality
Inﬂuence on the
EU’s Russia-policy
Normative discourse Transformation Russia is democratic, market-
economy
Fundamental, legally
present
1990s – early 2000s
‘Neo-Ostpolitik’
discourse
Strategic-
civilizational
Reliability and understanding
between the EU and Russia
Weak or none, overspill is
automatic
Mid- and late 1990s,
early 2010s
‘Business case’
discourse
None Prosperuous economic relations None Second half of the
2000s, until 2014
Economic statecraft
discourse
Strategic-
coercive
Maximazing EU power,
disciplining Russia
Optional and selective In the 2010s
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challenging. The failure of the renewal of PCA in 2007 has been the ﬁrst and often cited example, how the
widening value gap can handicap other, economic activities (Emerson et al. 2006). Still, in normative
approaches, economic relations do not play a speciﬁc role, but they are dissolved in the general state of
relations.
No doubt, the normative argument may give credible explanations why persuasion and argu-
ments do not work in the EU-Russian economic relations (Kratochwil 2008). Nonetheless, these
views have been criticized from several standpoints. Authors demonstrate the realist elements in
the EU’s policies (Averre 2009; Youngs 2004) or the normative nature of the Russian foreign and
foreign economic agenda (Makarychev 2008; Casier 2013). Russian and constructivist authors often
point to the interest-related origins of norms, as interests are also a matter of social mediation
(Wendt 1992). If the value gap remains so onerous and untenable and the EU’s ultimate objective is
still to create common norms with Russia, the development of bilateral economic relations remains
groundless (Kazantsev and Sakwa 2012). In reality, economic ﬁelds remained the most prosperous
within the relations. Two complementary entities with respective comparative advantages, eco-
nomic issues are rarely mentioned as the origins of the current conﬂict.
Broad economic relations are traditionally perceived as win-win situations and thus inherently
inﬂuencing the general state of relations. Developing trade and investment relations even if without
underlying intentions may establish interaction in other ﬁelds in the longer run. The 'neo-Ostpolitik'
arguments recognize and accept Russia’s otherness even in the long–term, do not harbor transfor-
mative aspirations and reject the normative discourse’s solid conditionality, as the basis of the
relations. Their main objective is to consolidate the relations even in the absence of short- or mid-
term normative convergence. In this regard the main question, whether the EU economic relations
can help in Russian modernization (Timmermann 1996; Popescu 2014; Connoly 2015). In this
approach, the modernization is a rather value-neutral phenomenon with predominantly economic
constituencies. Inter alia economic relations between FRG and the Soviet Union in the times of
Ostpolitik were less normative, but highly relevant from the political and security point of view.
'Neo-Ostpolitik' concepts purport the strategic signiﬁcance of Russia for the EU. As the semi-
oﬃcial paper published in 1994 Reﬂections on European Policy highlighted, the EU has to develop
a policy which would ‘give Russia the certainty that, alongside the EU, it is acknowledged as the
other center of the political order in Europe’ (Timmins 2011, 191–192). Authors from these
discourses strive for creating imperatives for bilateral relations when cooperative behavior provides
higher, even non-economic pay-outs for both partners than non-cooperative attitudes. They
mistrust external domestication eﬀorts and take a much more gradualist and optional view on
convergence. The contribution of these pragmatist views was essential in the 1990s in under-
standing the structural diﬀerences between CEE and the Post-Soviet region, debating some early
and highly optimistic views of transitology (Ericson 1991). As some authors accentuated, trade
liberalization is not without alternatives in Russia: without a Central European trajectory, stagnating
or even declining competitiveness, market opening and fast-track accession to the WTO do not
make much sense. Thus, the EU assumptions on pertinent approximation policies, focusing on
integration might fall short of expectations (Timmermann 1996; Sapir 2002). These views and the
need for economic pragmatism revisited the literature many times, especially during the ebbs of
bilateral relations.
Critics often argue that this attitude is identical with the Russian notion, which perceives Europe
as a 'modernization resource' rather than a 'modernization partner' (Barysch 2005). Furthermore,
the concept of automatic overspill from economic to non-economic ﬁelds has often been ques-
tioned. Putin still represents the interests of a peripheral capitalist system and the conﬂicts arise
from their wish to preserve their autonomy in world politics and economy both inside the country
and vis-a-vis the West (Sakwa 2011). Interpreting the annexation of the Crimea and the conﬂict in
Ukraine since 2014 constitute major challenges for these authors, questioning the process of
educational-civilizational engagement through trade.
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Understandably, economic relations do not have to be conﬂated with other aspects of
external relations by any means. Being the core of the EU project, trade and investment policies
have their established internal logic and system of interests. Not surprisingly, EU external
actions refer much more to economic relations as an asset of the EU policy set, than reversed.
Independently from the heady rhetoric’s of the Commission, the system of economic policy-
making remained closed and non-politicized, relying predominantly on selﬁsh economic inter-
ests of relevant internal actors. These ‘business-case’ arguments came into view in the debates
around energy interdependence and security. Authors often demystiﬁed and desecuritizied EU-
Russia energy trade (Goldthau 2008), argued in favor of market solutions and criticized the
excessive political or policy involvement in these ﬁelds (Götz 2008). Another, critical bifurcation
of these views conceived the EU’s Eastern policy concessions, the content of Partnership and
Cooperation Agreements, signed in the mid-1990s with regional countries, as insuﬃcient to
prompt integrationist dynamics (Dabrowski 2008). According to these opinions, the negotiated
trade opening is asymmetrical in favor of the EU (Gower 1997), the extensive application of anti-
dumping measures amounts to EU protectionism (Jones and Fallon 2003). The Wider Europe
initiative reﬂected the enlargement fatigue, rather than a new beginning in relation to Russia
and the region (Dabrowski 2008). The EU shall at least oﬀer asymmetric trade preferences on
a permanent basis, show more ﬂexibility in order to support the catching up process (Messerlin
et al. 2011). The Union is especially tight-ﬁsted in its visa policies, hindering Russian society from
confronting the European reality and inspire a bottom-up transformative process inside the
country. In this light, the EU is a more realist or pragmatist economic power, while convergence
largely depends on the partners than the center itself.
Nonetheless, the current systematic constraints of the EU-Russia economic relations are taken as
self-evident in the academic literature. Russia’s ‘state-led capitalism’, features diﬀerently those of
the EU’s ‘coordinated, liberal or dependent market economies’ (Nölke et al. 2015). Russia is a hybrid
system unlike Europe’s capitalist order at Kornai (Kornai 2016), while Russian modernization eﬀorts
led by its ‘military bureaucrats’ are decisively diﬀerent from Eastern European ‘upgrading’ concepts
(Trimberger 1978). All these works of the Varieties of Capitalism theories, Elite Sociology, and
Development Studies point to the fact that the Russian economic regime inherently oriented
towards internal sources of growth, ownership and modernization. In these patterns the role of
foreign capital and trade cannot become a systematic constituency, it is subordinated to domestic
capital and know-how accumulation eﬀorts. Unlike in the CEE countries, excessive dominance of
foreign capital is perceived as a threat to sovereignty and source of political vulnerability. These
features also set clear limits for EU-Russian economic cooperation. Furthermore, the Western
sanction policy since 2014 repeatedly manifested the strategic overspill into economic spheres,
demonstrating the diﬃculties of separation between the two ﬁelds.
While it may be questionable, whether a more powerful partner should impose or even set
economic objectives on a weaker neighbor (Jones and Fallon 2003), the EU’s Russia policy goals
appeared to be at least implicitly supported by Russia until the second half of the 2000s. Then, by
the gradual vanishing of the 'Four Common Spaces' initiative, growing tensions and conﬂicts
brought the issue of economic conditionality and 'economic statecraft' concepts, as more unilateral
policy assets to the foreground (Baldwin 1985; Haukkala 2009; Connoly 2016). Their main proposi-
tion is that the EU’s vantage point vis-a-vis Russia is economy. Existing asymmetries shall be
intensively used to shape Russian behavior in other ﬁelds. Nevertheless, the ultimate objective is
not normative approximation per se, but vindicating the EU’s 'power through trade' capabilities
(Meunier and Kalypso Nicolaïdis 2006), engage the tug-of-war from the European side in order to
balance the relationship in other, security, political or human rights dimensions. These considera-
tions were highly represented in times of contentious politics and sanctions, particularly during
Russia’s Chechen wars in the 1990s and after the 2014 Ukraine-crisis.
The central modality of economic statecraft notions is asymmetry in the relations. Asymmetry is
present in many other ﬁelds of the relations: the EU countries’ combined military expenditure is
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ﬁve times more than that of Russia, its representation in international organizations, global and
regional governance exceeds the one of Moscow. At the same time, disparities in the economic
ﬁeld are bigger and the supranational nature of common policies provide suﬃcient authority to
pursue more complex policies (Forsberg and Seppo 2009). The good combination of market power
and authority can provide opportunities to be applied both for rewarding and punitive purposes.
Inter alia the mix of preferential trade agreements and hard-standard conditionality are often seen
as the key to successful inﬂuence (Hafner-Burton 2005).
According to mainstream academic literature, the overall record of the EU’s economic statecraft
in Russia is rather poor. The explanations are manifold: the dominance of energy in the EU’s
imports and their strategic signiﬁcance, the regained Russian ﬁnancial self-rule after 2000 (Haukkala
2009) limits the scope and instruments to be utilized in an asymmetric way. The relative nature of
asymmetries and the problems of their validation in interdependent situations (Dabrowski 2008;
Jones, 1984) is a structural impediment in these eﬀorts. The low level of Russian legal integration
into world economy substantially complicates to use statecraft in a legal, normative manner
(Dreyer and Hindley 2008). At the same time, problems with realizing economic power are much
more deep-rooted and stem from the EU’s own actorness in most of the literature.
Forsberg and Seppo provided three explanations, why the EU could not validate its economic
supremacy vis-a-vis Russia (Forsberg and Seppo 2009). These are the lack of unity between the
member states (Leonard and Popescu 2007), bad strategy and the wrong assessment of the
relevance of the given power instrument in the given situation. While the ﬁrst argument is the
most referred and salient, the weak strategy played important role in some cases (like in the
Siberian overﬂight debate) the authors argue in favor of the third case as the most typical in the
bilateral relations. The EU was often detrimentally oﬀensive because of too high initial expecta-
tions, while its inclusion in economic debates was not always advantageous in solving them. Russia
could easily misuse the gaps between the EU’s expectations and capabilities.
These four schools of thoughts dominated the academic literature in the last 30 years. Their
relative inﬂuence of actual policy has been changing due to a number of diﬀerent factors. Internal
debates around Russia policy, especially at the level of the nation states shows a relatively static
picture. Pragmatism on the foreign policy and economic level, especially in ‘friendly pragmatist’
countries often referred to neo-Ostpolitik arguments, while ‘new cold warriors’ and even some
‘strategic partners’ predominantly used the normative arguments (Leonard and Popescu 2007). In
this regard, the attitudes towards Russia seem to be socially and ideologically ﬁxed at the level in
many of the nation states. European policy evolution had a more formidable role in the changing
contexts of the EU-Russia economic relations. Normative conditionality for economic interactions
became a general EU norm since the years of the early transition, even if its enforcement remains
obviously diﬃcult. The benchmark for economic cooperation has become more complex and
diverse due to the EU’s deepening and enlargement process, providing new arguments for ‘neo-
Ostpolitik’, 'Business case' and even ‘economic statecraft’ discourses. The EU-Russia economic
discourses developed simultaneously with the EU capabilities. Nonetheless, the biggest input
into the debates between these schools was delivered by the volatile perception and development
of Russia itself.
3. The history of disappointment in friendship with the West: the Russia’s EU policy
In comparison with the Western publication, the Russian ones are usually more policy-oriented.
Typical studies of experienced Russian experts have a solid empirical base but often lack their own
theoretical constructions. The majority of academic contributions remains in the ‘Business case’
discourse. Nevertheless, Russian disappointment in the EU policy in CEE and CIS as a part of total
disappointment in friendship with the West after the end of Cold War, as well as some signiﬁcant
political events inﬂuenced even Russian research narratives. As a result, we can make a politically
based periodization of Russian studies on EU-Russian relations (see Table 2).
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In the 1990s Russian experts on European countries investigated mainly the positive and
translatable experiences of the EU and their applicability during the Russian political and economic
transformation into the market economy and real democracy (Baranovsky et al. 1992; Kudrov,
Shenayev, and Volodin 1996). At the turn of the century leading Russian specialists began to
discuss future outlines of EU-Russian economic relations. There were slightly optimistic views
regarding EU assistance in Russian domestic reforms or WTO accession. However, these studies
emphasized the large number of diﬃculties during a potential Russian integration into Western
European institutions. They also explained that Russia’ Europeanness does not contradict to its
leadership in post-Soviet integrations as alternatives to EU-centric ones. For instance, the Russian
way into ‘Common European House’ was determined not only by global geopolitical shifts at the
end of Cold War but also by long and diﬃcult transformation of inner Russian social, economic and
political processes (Borko 1993). At the same time, the analysis of Russian bilateral economic
relations with member states remained the dominant topic (e.g. [Yevropa 1995]). Germany and
France were traditionally the main countries for analysis.
On the eve of centuries, Russian experts began to stress asymmetry in the EU’s and Russian
economic weight and characterize it as a serious problem for the economic relations. Political
tensions (including the Western policy of ‘double standards’ when EU member states did not
support Russia in its struggle against terrorists) were also named as a barrier for serene economic
dialogue (Shenaev and Shmelev 2000).
Unfortunately, the majority of Russian articles and books on EU-Russian economic cooperation
are published in Russian. This can be explained by the speciﬁcities of local requirements for
a successful academic carrier and the dominance of Russian-language audience of think tanks.
Indeed, you can easily receive Ph.D. and even Professorship in Russia without English-language
articles. Moreover, many Russian scholars want to inﬂuence Russian oﬃcials and public opinion
while Russian people almost never read texts of Russian citizens about Russia in English. It also
requires considerable additional eﬀorts from Russian experts to write English-language publica-
tions. As a result, we can see a language-based asymmetry: the majority of Russian researchers
could easily read the articles of their colleagues in the EU and try to explain misunderstandings for
Russians but their signals of disappointment almost never inﬂuenced the EU’s discourse. It was only
in 2014, when the RSF (Russian Science Foundation) established barriers for participation in grant
competition, incentivizing Russian scholars to cooperate with English-language journals (usually
Table 2. Periodization of Russian studies on EU-Russian economic relations.
Years Main features of period Typical research agenda
Political events which showed the
end of period
1992–1999 Illusions of Eurooptimism during
Russian market
transformation
History of European economic
integration; speciﬁcs of the EU
policies (as lessons for Russia and
CIS); bilateral economic relations
with EU member states
The EU’s misunderstanding of the
Russian struggle against terrorists
in Chechnya and the NATO’s
military aggression in Yugoslavia
1999–2008 Adaptation to the EU
enlargement and Putin’s
attempts to build partnership
with leading EU member
states
Choice of main geographical vectors
of Russian economic ties and
format of EU-Russian relations;
further development of the EU;
barriers for economic cooperation
between Russia and EU member
states
The absence of reaction on Putin’s
speech in Munich in 2007, the lack
of new EU-Russian agreement and
the 2008 war in South Ossetia
2008–2015 Crisis in EU-Russian relations Reasons of the crisis in EU-Russian
relations; prospects of EU-Russian
economic relations; formats of
cooperation between the EU,
Russia and other post-Soviet states
The political crisis in Ukraine, failure
of the Partnership for
Modernization and EU-Russian visa
dialogue, tensions between Russia
and NATO member states in Syria
Since 2015 New Cold War Consequences of the ‘sanctions war’;
prospects of Russian shift into East
– (current situation)
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team-leaders in social sciences should publish at least 3–4 articles in Scopus or WoS Core Collection
databases in every ﬁve years).
The growing interest in the topic of economic cooperation in Russia was explained by institu-
tional progress in EU-Russian relations, introduction of euro and the inevitability of the EU largest
ever enlargement. Chapters on EU-Russian relations appeared in many Russian books presenting
various aspects of the EU’s history and its current situation. Several collective monographs from
leading centers of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Institute of World Economy and International
Relations and Institute of Europe) and universities were published (e.g. Arbatova et al. 2003;
Butorina and Borko 2006; Gutnik and Klemeshev 2006; Butorina 2011; Potemkina 2012). These
studies were based on deep analysis of statistics and empirical facts. Detailed discussions on
possible ways of further development of Russian economic ties were also presented. These
publications raised the major questions of that period: the possibility of multi-vector orientation
of Russia vs. the deepening economic contacts with the EU, reality vs. formality in EU-Russian
oﬃcial documents (e.g. in roadmaps of four common EU-Russian spaces), and real barriers for
further EU-Russian economic cooperation vs. ﬁctitious problems of Russian investment climate
announced by EU businessmen or politicians for the sake of preservation Russian dependency from
Western policy-makers (which was typical in the 1990s).
The incongruent research traditions and informational asymmetries explain the diﬀerent posi-
tions that Russian and Western scholars take regarding the initial point of the EU-Russian crisis. The
majority of Western experts traces it back to political actions (‘Yukos case’, war in South Ossetia in
2008 or even re-uniﬁcation of Crimea with Russia in 2014) while typical Russian experts demon-
strate the long history of mistrust and unfair competition between the EU and Russia (in which the
NATO intervention in Yugoslavia or the EU’s support of a coup d’etat in Ukraine were only
episodes). These trends had been interrupted by short periods of improvement due to illusions
of Russian Europe-oriented experts hoping for Russia becoming a peer partner of Western
European states.
A good demonstration is the article about the consequences of the EU enlargement of a famous
Russian specialist (Ivanov 2003). He wrote about possible, but ambiguous positive consequences
for Russia. At the same time he stressed the negative implications in foreign trade (due to new
custom and non-tariﬀ barriers as well as unfair competitive practice of the EU in agriculture and
some other sectors), transit issues (including the case of Kaliningrad), border cooperation and the
likely decrease in the EU’s willingness to improve relations with Russia because of the growing
bureaucracy and contradictions in positions of member states. In 2008 it was typical to read in
Russian-language articles that many factors may contribute to the further growth of bilateral
exchange of goods, services, and capital. On the other hand, problems in the energy sector,
ineﬀective talks about the new base agreement and diﬃcult search for the methods of EU-
Russian integration development could lead to reduction of the Euro-centric character of foreign
economic relations of Russia (Obolenskiy 2008).
The emerging crisis in EU-Russian relations stimulated the Russian research on EU. Sometimes
economic cooperation between the EU and Russia was only a part of broader research agendas on
Russian economic image abroad, structure and dynamics of foreign trade, special features of
inward and outward foreign direct investment (FDI) or participation in projects of regional eco-
nomic integration. For example, a slightly transformed research team from the Institute of World
Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) continued its studies on FDI. This team broadened
its analysis of the main features of the economy of various EU member states and their inﬂuence
on European outward FDI in diﬀerent regions of the world, including speciﬁcs of FDI in Russia
(Kuznetsov 2008). It was shown that research of Russian outward FDI in Western countries was one-
sided. These imbalances are often misperceived in Europe due to Western stereotypes on Russian
business culture and outward FDI realities like the lack of competitive private companies (especially
in non-resource sectors). As a result, Russian investors met signiﬁcant barriers for their expansion in
the EU (Kuznetsov 2010). This tradition continues although Russian scholars try to elaborate some
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concepts in addition to empirical analysis. Nord Stream 2 pipeline becomes one of the best
examples (Zagashvili 2017).
At the same time, Russian scholars almost ignore economic statecraft discourse which becomes
more popular in the EU 2010s. Russian scholars do not pretend to elaborate their own special
theoretical concepts, but they use means of their traditional empirical analysis and show that EU
ignores Russian interests, for example, in energy issues. Russians admit that the EU tries to reach its
own aims (like geographical diversiﬁcation of oil and gas imports and decrease Gazprom’s invest-
ment dominance in pipeline sector of the Baltic region and Eastern Europe) and to dictate its policy
(Obolenskiy 2015). But almost all explanations are rooted in old-style political concepts including
neo-colonialism. However, there are some other approaches. Indeed, we can ﬁnd among Russian
articles the conceptualization and setting an appropriate research framework for previous stages
and the current state of EU-Russia energy dialogue (Romanova 2013).
As a result, several well-known Russian specialists presented results of their long-term studies
just at the beginning of a new phase of the crisis in EU-Russian economic relations in 2014. For
example, the situation in Ukraine was considered as a negative result of competition between two
economic integrations (the EU and Russian-led post-Soviet integration). Nevertheless, Russian
experts have lost their illusion that the EU could recognize economic cooperation in the framework
of triangle ‘EU-Ukraine-EAEU’ (Vinokurov et al. 2014) only with diﬃculty. It took some time for
Russian experts to become more realistic and analyze the ‘sanctions war’ and its consequences (e.g.
Klinova and Sidorova 2014; Shirov et al. 2015; Kuznetsov 2016).
4. Conclusion
Given these parallel typologies, it is important to ask a basic question: whether the Western and EU
discourses gravitated, resulted in a mutual learning process leading to interaction and some sort of
common understanding. As it has been described above, the two sets of discourses showed only
modest interaction with each other: for Russian authors, the European Union remained predomi-
nantly an economic entity which shall be approached on an utilitarian way, based on self-interests.
For Western authors, the strategic component has been salient since the very beginning of the
relationship. These views remained rather isolated and correlated only periodically.
The period after the ﬁnancial crisis was one of the few examples of mutual understanding. It
brought a good deal of ‘realism’ in this regard: both Western and EU authors described the relation-
ship as ‘stagnating’ (Popescu 2014), as one of ‘mutual non-understanding’ (Bordachev 2016), ‘crisis of
trust’ (Van Elsuwege 2012), as ‘Russia-fatigue’ on the European and ‘EU-fatigue’ on the Russian side
(Meister 2013) or as a situation created by the ‘Kremlin’s isolationist trends’ (Trenin 2013). These
authors saw the way-out through establishing a more pragmatist agenda for the relationship:
separation of political and strategic considerations on both sides and looking at the relations
primarily through their own respective interests. This presupposed a less visionary attitude from
the EU’s side, while bigger trust and less strategic thinking from the Russian one. Understandably,
economic cooperation was seen as a solid fundament which shall deliver mutual beneﬁts, compen-
sating conﬂicts in the common neighborhood and from other strategic ﬁelds.
At the same time, some dissatisfaction with the state of economic relations has also been
present in the literature. According to these views, the spectacular growth in mutual trade and
investments was only the result of comparative advantages, namely the result of a center-periphery
division of labor. Russia remained predominantly and increasingly an energy supplier to the West,
while the EU remained a provider of manufactured goods to the Russian market, without real
inclusion of Russia into its industrial value chains. This created one-sided patterns both in invest-
ments and trade, according to economic integration theories (Balassa 1961) the relations remained
constrained. In these approaches, the ultimate validation of interests in the EU-Russian relations
and the accompanying social transformations are taken as normal phenomena (Anderson 2007).
The conﬂict is also a result of economic tendencies: Putin’s Russia represents the interests of
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a peripheral capitalist system and the conﬂicts arise from its wish to preserve their autonomy in
world politics and economy both inside the country and vis-a-vis the West (Sakwa 2011).
The 2014 crisis, the sanctions and the following economic downturn in the relations hampered
the positive expectations and gave way to some kind of perplexity. While it redesigned the political
and economic discourses both in Russia and the EU, the overall eﬀect was a disillusionment in the
economic determination of the relations. Until the crisis, for most of the academic thinkers, the
basic assumptions was that economic cooperation may consolidate the relations or at least can be
developed independently of it. The 2014 crisis was a major demonstration, that economy is not an
independent variable in the ties, it can be substantially eﬀected by non-economic inﬂuences. This is
a major critical observation and academics on both sides have to assimilate these experiences.
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